In the Transcendent Philosophy, the basis of particular gradation is the return of the shared element to the distinguishing factor. This is a general rule and criterion for particular gradation, based on which at least three types of such gradation can be defined. In the first type, plurality dominates oneness so that all beings and plural things in the world merely share the aspect of being in existence. In the next type, oneness dominates plurality so that all the multiple beings of the world comprise the stages of a single being. The third type of particular gradation is midway between the other two types. Based on the particular gradation discussed by Aqa Ali Mudarres in the book of Bidayah al-hikam, oneness dominates plurality among possible multiple beings because all of them comprise the different grades of a single and absolute being. However, between the Almighty Necessary and the collection of possible multiple things, it is plurality which dominates oneness.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

Education is a continually developing activity, it shapes the way an individual develops their attitudes, thoughts and behavior. Education is not just about being literate but it is an overall development of the person in every aspect of their lives. A society's educational system can be greatly linked to its culture as the culture that one is in have an affect on the type of curriculum the institutions will develop in order to cater to every individual of that particular culture. Education moulds and shapes a society and it is influenced by the culture of the particular country or society. The educational system acts as a point of reference for the society's needs and demands. The principles that dominate this article is culture and education are interrelated and interconnected. Every educational paradigm is influenced by the culture of the society in which it operates. This essay underlines the extensive connection between culture and education. As a result, the goal of this essay is to depict these features from a Philosophical-Psychological Approach.

Western epistemology, particularly representationalist epistemology, is the basic conviction behind Rorty's critical attacks. Rorty' s pragmatic approach aims to find explanations for political and ethical viwes of contemporary West. Such an approach is deeply rooted in teachings of linguistics, and descriptive approaches toward the formation of human’s understanding of entities. But in an atmosphere of theories, can Rorty be able to avoid meta-theoretical damages on the one hand, and normative views in the field of science, on the other hand.

Successors of contracting parties are persons who principally or by their representatives or not involved in concluding a contract, but contract's effects, with the whole or a part of parties patrimony, or the subject of the contract, will be transmitted to them, by the effects of contract. We mean the obligatory effects, i.e. rights and obligations. Usually, the successors are divided into two groups: general and particular. General successor is the one who is the substitute one of the parties by transmitting whole or a join part of parties patrimony. But particular successor is a one who has acquired the contractual rights and obligations of transferor will transmission of definite property. In this case, only those rights and obligations are acquired by the assignee which are connected to the property and are necessities and attachments of it.

Aristotle gives a definition of "universal" that Łukasiewicz considers non-comprehensive because it does not include null universals. In addition, Aristotle's definition of a particular can be understood in two ways: (1) a particular can only be predicated on one thing, (2) a particular cannot be predicated. This double conception, which is repeated with great frequency in the words of Aristotle's commentators, on the one hand, calls into question the opinion of Koons and Pickavance - who believe that a particular in Aristotle's view is unpredicable; And on the other hand, it is a conflict that must be resolved. In this essay, it will be shown that, firstly, Łukasiewicz's objection is not relevent and Aristotle's definition also includes null universals; And secondly, the conflict that seems to arise from the definition of particular can be resolved by distinguishing two types of predication, "in the manner of one name" and "not in the manner of one name".

To many philosophers the concept of Necessary being is a universal concept and in proving unity of necessary being we are to demonstrate the unity of what is signified (mesdaq) of it. This view is not consistent with the doctrine of personal single God of theistic faiths. In order to meet the challenge some come to believe that the concept “necessary being” is a particular one in such a way that it is impossible to conceive multiple instances for it. Accordingly, universal as it may seem to be at the first glance, through further examination it become clear that it is particular. This article is to examine the pros and cons of the this philosophical view.

One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical propositions is inconsistent with his discussion at conditionals; and his analogy between the two realms is more confusing than explaining! Despite this, in this paper, I’ ll show that by using some branches in Modern Logic, such as second-order logic, modal logic and temporal logic, many of the ambiguities and the objections can be replied. Also, I’ ll glance at the reflection of the discussion in some of Ibn-Sina’ s great followers: Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Afdal Al-Din Al-Khunaji, Athir Al-Din Al-Abhari, Khaje Nasir Al-Tusi, Shams Al-Din Al-Samaqandi and Qutb Al-Din Al-Razi. I shall show haw far they are from Ibn-Sina. Besides, it will be clear that their distinctions between contingent conditional and particular cogent conditional are very weak and, indeed, cannot help any way to understand the distinction.